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 Managerial pay is a controversial and often studied subject in economics, sociology, 
accounting, finance, and human resource management. In fact, relative to the number of people 
who are actually top managers, this subject garners an incredible amount of attention. One of the 
reasons may be simply that the data are available. This has been true for managers in for-profit 
firms for decades, but only recently have data become available to permit the study of 
managerial compensation in the nonprofit sector. In this chapter, I compare how top managers in 
the for-profit and nonprofit sectors are paid using two unique panel data sets covering the years 
1992 through 1998. 
 First I provide some simple background on the literature on managerial pay in for-profit 
firms. I then explore some of the institutional differences between the nonprofit and for-profit 
sectors and consider whether these differences should lead us to expect that managers in the two 
sectors might be paid differently. Next, I examine pay gaps between the for-profit and nonprofit 
sectors more generally and detail several hypotheses that have been widely discussed for 
differences in pay and describe how they can be applied to top managers as well. 
 In the main part of the chapter, I describe the data sources and explain how managers are 
actually paid in the two sectors. For the nonprofit sector, I use data from the Internal Revenue 
Service Form 990, which reports details of the compensation of top managers and a host of 
financial and accounting characteristics for each organization with at least $25,000 in net 
revenue. For the for-profit sector, I use a sample of over fifteen hundred firms from Standard & 
Poor’s EXECUCOMP database. This set of data uses filings to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to report on the compensation of top managers as well as accounting and financial 
information for publicly traded firms. 
Managerial Pay        3 
 
 I note, first, that the relationship between firm size and managerial pay is strong in data 
from both sectors. Second, in both sectors, there is substantial diversity across industries on 
average pay rates for top managers. Third, I suggest some simple theoretical reasons for 
differences in pay across the sectors. Fourth, I provide a brief overview of differences in 
managerial pay by gender in both sectors. Finally, I document that although managers in 
nonprofits are paid substantially less than managers in for-profit organizations (especially when 
stock options are taken into account), this is largely due to organization size. When for-profits 
and nonprofits of similar asset size are compared, the average salary and bonus differences 
across sectors are not large for the samples investigated here. On the other hand, stock options 
(which are not available to leaders of nonprofits) nearly double the compensation of the leaders 
of for-profit firms. I end the chapter with a summary, some concluding comments, some lessons 
learned, and possible avenues for future research. 
 
Overview of Managerial Pay 
 
 The study of managerial pay has focused almost exclusively on the for-profit sector. Only 
recently has there been interest in managerial compensation in nonprofit organizations. This, like 
many issues in labor economics, may be driven by the fact that data on managerial pay in the for-
profit sector have been available for some time, whereas comparable data for nonprofits have 
only recently become available. There are at least three main reasons why top-managerial pay 
has received so much attention in the past few decades. First, the agency theory literature, 
beginning in the 1970s and early 1980s (for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 
1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Fama, 1980; Lazear and Rosen, 1981) set a theoretical 
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foundation for the work. Second, the data on for- profit firms have been publicly available for 
some time and since 1992 have been organized in a standardized format. Third, since CEO pay 
in for-profit firms has increased so dramatically, it has garnered a great deal of public attention. 
 The theoretical work in the 1970s and increased data availability in the 1980s and 1990s 
cleared the way for a great deal of empirical work on the compensation of top managers of firms. 
The areas of empirical work could be categorized into several areas (see Hallock and Murphy, 
1999, for a more detailed summary). I will only very briefly describe a few of these. Each of 
these areas has received substantial attention using data from for-profit organizations and almost 
none using data from nonprofits (with the exceptions of Oster, 1998, and Hallock, 2002a, 
2002b). Perhaps each of the areas described here will gain further attention from the nonprofit 
sector in the coming years. 
 The relationship between executive pay and company performance has been widely 
studied for decades. Rosen (1992) provides an outstanding overview of the empirical and 
theoretical literature. I will highlight several other publications in this literature. Murphy (1985) 
examines the relationship between executive compensation and firm financial performance 
(stock returns) using a longitudinal sample of CEOs from 1964 to 1981. Although most previous 
cross-sectional studies showed a weak relationship between managerial pay and company 
performance, Murphy carefully exploited the panel nature of the data to show that there was a 
substantial link. 
 In another important contribution to this literature, Jensen and Murphy (1990) consider 
whether the relation between CEO pay and stock price performance is strong enough to provide 
important incentives to managers. After a lengthy empirical analysis, they conclude that the pay-
to-performance sensitivity is too low to provide important incentives. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
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collect details on stock options and document an enormous increase in the receipt of options by 
executives in the 1980s and 1990s but also show that when options are valued as compensation 
at the time they are granted, there is a strong relationship between managerial pay and firm 
financial performance. 
 Antle and Smith (1986) and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) study relative performance 
evaluation for CEOs. They are interested in whether managers are paid for absolute performance 
(for example, how well their firm alone performs) or for how well their firm performs relative to 
a set of peer firms, which could be defined as those in the same industry or as the market as a 
whole. There seems to be some evidence (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990) that managers are paid 
for relative performance. 
 Another area in executive pay that has received some attention in recent decades is CEO 
turnover. Among the findings (Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 
1988) is that top managers of firms are much more likely to turn over when their firms perform 
relatively poorly. There is also substantial new work in the area of international CEO 
compensation (for example, Conyon and Murphy, 2000). 
 
Institutional Differences Between the For-Profit and Nonprofit Sectors That May Matter 
for Compensation 
 
 Obviously, nonprofit organizations do not have returns to shareholders or some other 
obvious “bottom line” by which to judge their managers (Hallock, 2002b). However, that does 
not mean that they should necessarily be paid a salary that is not in any way based on 
performance. In the literature on CEO pay and firm performance, most analysts use relatively 
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few performance measures to test how well the top manager is doing. Among these measures are 
stock return and the change in market value of the firm (Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). Since nonprofits are not owned by shareholders, there is no stock price or “value” of the 
charities in this sense. Also, obviously the objectives of nonprofits are remarkably diverse. They 
may include such missions as serving a particular group or discovering the cure for a disease. It 
is therefore quite difficult to focus on a single particular objective of nonprofits generally. 
Consequently, the outcome of interest in nonprofits is likely to be much more diverse than for 
commercial firms. In a series of publications (for example, Steinberg, 1990a, 1990b; Weisbrod, 
1989), incentive compensation for employees in nonprofits is examined mostly from a 
theoretical point of view. We know that designing incentive compensation plans in for-profit 
firms is difficult (Lazear, 1995). However, it may be more difficult to measure the performance 
of managers in nonprofits because these organizations are likely to be striving to create 
something much different from returns to shareholders. One feature that makes nonprofits 
distinct from for-profit organizations is that “a nonprofit organization is, in essence, an 
organization that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise 
control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees” (Hansmann, 1980, p. 838). 
However, this does not mean that nonprofit organizations cannot make profits in a technical 
sense but rather that “it is only the distribution of profits that is prohibited” (p. 838). This 
“nondistribution constraint” does not imply, however, that employee pay cannot be based on 
incentives (Steinberg, 1990b). 
 A classic example of how difficult it is to measure output for managers in the nonprofit 
world is that of a manager of a nursing home (Weisbrod and Schlesinger, 1986). A nursing home 
manager’s pay could be based on the profits he or she accrues, but this gives incentives to 
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provide lower-quality care to the patients. The output that the board of the nursing home seeks 
(say, “trustworthiness”) is difficult to observe. If we tried to measure trustworthiness, we could 
do it using an easy-to-observe measure such as the mortality rate. However, this might induce 
management to select patients who are mostly healthy, which is, no doubt, at odds with the 
mission of the board. 
 Clearly, studying incentive compensation in for-profit firms is extremely difficult. It may 
be even more difficult in nonprofits. Nevertheless, the attention paid to managerial pay in 
nonprofits is increasing, and as mentioned previously, nonprofit boards must now document how 
pay is determined (“Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2,” 1996). Given the vast array of information 
available for each nonprofit and the fact that more nonprofits seem to be basing pay on 
incentives, there are potential ways to measure how well the charity is performing. Two will be 
examined in this chapter. One is the size of the organization. It may be that managers are given 
extra compensation for “growing the organization.” Since the single largest predictor of CEO 
pay in the for-profit sector is the size of the organization, this may make sense in the nonprofit 
sector as well. The other issue investigated here is the fraction of total expenses that is spent on 
program services (Hallock, 2002b). 
 
Conceptual Explanations for Differences in Pay Between Nonprofit and For-Profit 
Organizations 
 
 There are several conceptual explanations for differences in compensation between the 
for-profit and nonprofit sectors. They were first elaborated to apply to all nonprofit and for-profit 
workers but have been found to work equally well with top managers. The first is the so-called 
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labor donations hypothesis, first introduced by Preston (1989); the second, what I will refer to as 
“screening,” was first discussed in terms of nonprofits by Hansmann (1980); the third is the well-
known labor economic idea of compensating differentials; and the final one is what I will refer to 
as differences in returns to characteristics, or ability bias (Hallock, 2000). 
 The idea of labor donations is made clear by Preston (1989). The basic idea is that 
workers may be willing to trade lower wages for higher social benefits. Since workers value both 
wages and the social benefits they provide to the world, an organization that provides lots of 
social benefits can pay its workers, on average, less. The most extreme case of this is 
volunteering where “workers” are effectively donating back all of their wages to the organization 
to which they provide volunteer work. So one obvious reason why workers with similar 
characteristics are paid less in the nonprofit sector is that they are essentially giving back some of 
their wages to the cause for which they work. 
 Another potential reason for differences in compensation between the for-profit and 
nonprofit sectors has to do with Hansmann’s application of “screening” (1980, 1996). In this 
simple model, Hansmann assumes that there are two types of workers. Some are simply greedy, 
and others are interested in both the quality of service they provide and money. He also assumes 
that both groups are of equal ability and have similar alternative work opportunities. For 
nonprofit organizations to be able to survive and provide the requisite levels of service, they 
must pay people less to work in the nonprofits. One way for consumers to be assured that they 
are receiving the quality of service they want is for the organizations to organize as nonprofits. If 
they do so, only people who value both money and service quality will volunteer to work for 
them. Therefore, by virtue of being set up the way they are, nonprofits may be able to attract 
precisely the kinds of employees they want to attract. 
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 Another possible explanation for differences in compensation between the nonprofit and 
for-profit sectors may be compensating wage differentials (Rosen, 1974, 1986). Several authors 
(for example, Burbridge, 1994, and James and Rose- Ackerman, 1986) have suggested that one 
reason to expect lower wages in nonprofits stems from the amenities associated with nonprofit 
jobs that are not present in for-profit jobs. Some employees will prefer the combination of 
attractive amenities and lower pay in nonprofits to higher pay in for-profit firms. The classic 
example of compensating differentials is the risk of death: workers prefer safe (and lower-
paying) jobs to risky (and higher-paying) jobs. Perhaps nonprofits provide amenities for their 
workers such as more pleasant work environments, greater job flexibility, more stable positions, 
and more control over the job. 
 Several of these explanations are interesting and potentially important conceptual reasons 
for differences in pay between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. However, they are sometimes 
referred to as “residual arguments”—they make sense after careful attempts have been made to 
control for “other factors,” but they are very difficult to prove. Omitted-variables bias is another 
possibility. Perhaps there is some third variable that is correlated with both nonprofit status and 
compensation. Labor economists sometimes call this “ability,” but it is often intended to refer to 
organization, motivation, cognitive ability, or some other set of unmeasured characteristics. If 
this unmeasured effect is not taken into account when estimating the relationship between wages 
and nonprofit status, we may attribute too much of the wage gap to the nonprofit status and not 
to these unmeasured effects. Gooddeeris (1988), in a follow-up to Weisbrod (1983), considers 
selection issues in the nonprofit sector and finds them to be of some importance. 
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Evidence on Top Managerial Pay from Two Sectors 
 
 One of the main purposes of this chapter is to compare levels, types of pay, and 
compensation styles for top managers across the nonprofit and for-profit sectors (Hallock, 
2002b). Therefore, the data I have used are carefully described here. 
 
Data Description and Sample Characteristics 
 
 The data on the nonprofit sector are collected from Form 990 from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). The data from the for-profit sector are collected from Standard & Poor’s 
EXECUCOMP database. Both nonprofit organizations above a certain size and all publicly 
traded for-profit organizations must disclose financial information about themselves. The 
nonprofits must release information to the IRS and the for-profits to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). In both cases, in addition to basic financial information, details of the 
compensation of the five highest-paid employees must also be disclosed. 
 The data for the nonprofit organizations come from the Internal Revenue Service Form 
990 for the years 1992-1998. The IRS data contain useful information on all officers and 
directors of the nonprofits as well as the five highest- paid nonofficer, director, or trustee 
employees (I will refer to these as “employees” throughout). The IRS data contain three pieces of 
information on each officer, director, or other “key” employee. A key employee is defined by the 
IRS as “any person having responsibilities or power similar to officers, directors, or trustees. The 
term includes the chief management and administrative officials of an organization (such as an 
executive director or chancellor) but does not include the heads of separate departments or 
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smaller units within an organization” (Internal Revenue Service, 2002, p. 26). For each of these 
officers, I have information on the three components of their compensation summarized in Table 
7.1.1 know the base compensation including “salary, fees, bonuses, and severance payments 
paid” (p. 26). The mean for this variable over all years in the sample (in real 2002 dollars) is 
$146,587. The median is lower ($114,722), since some organizations pay their top people quite a 
bit more, which draws up the mean but not the median. I also have information on contributions 
to employee benefit plans and deferred compensation including medical and life insurance. The 
average value of this over all years of the sample is $15,747 (median, $7,034). Finally, I have 
information on “expense allowances or reimbursements that the recipients must report as income 
on their own separate income tax returns. These include the value of housing or cars provided by 
the organization” (p. 26). The mean for this category is $3,142. The average of the sum of all 
three categories is $165,476 (median, $127,239) over the sample period. The total compensation 
numbers for the top officer remained relatively constant from 1992 to 1998, as can be seen in the 
table. 
 The bottom panel of Table 7.1 reports some of the financial and potential “performance” 
measures for these nonprofit organizations. For example, the average net ending assets is $64.3 
million, and the median is $17.8 million. This number increased over the sample period, except 
for a curious large drop in 1997. The sum of government grants, direct public support, and 
indirect public support is also displayed in the table. The average is just under $7.9 million, with 
a median of almost $1.1 million. 
 Table 7.1 also shows the percentage of total expenses that are spent on program services. 
This can be considered a measure of what fraction of spending is put toward programs for those 
in need. In fact, the Council of Better Business Bureaus’ Wise Giving Alliance Standards for 
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Charitable Accountability state (in Standard 8) that a charity must “spend at least 65 percent of 
its total expenses on program activities” (Council of Better Business Bureaus, 2003). For the 
sample of nonprofits for which I have data, the average share of expenses spent on program 
services is 81.5 percent. This number has declined slightly over time. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
 For the for-profit firms, I used data from Standard & Poor’s EXECUCOMP database (see 
Table 7.2). The data contain specific financial and compensation information for all firms in the 
Standard & Poor’s 500, the Standard & Poor’s Midcap 400, and the Standard & Poor’s Smallcap 
600. Like the data for nonprofit organizations, these data are for the seven-year period 1992-
1998. All financial and compensation data are adjusted to real 1998 dollars. There are 9,599 
firm- year observations in the data. 
 EXECUCOMP is the standard in executive compensation research. Prior to the 
construction of EXECUCOMP, researchers who wished to study executive compensation had to 
compile their own data sets. EXECUCOMP is now used by most researchers in the field. 
 A problem for some of the research on executive compensation is the question of what to 
do about stock options. Options are often given to executives in blocks every few years, and 
previous research often focused on the value of options when they were exercised, not when they 
were granted. However, the total compensation figures I use in this chapter include not only 
salaries, bonuses, and “other” compensation but also the value of stock options granted in a 
particular year as valued by the Black and Scholes (1973) option-pricing formula. This measure 
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of total compensation gives a much more accurate view of the actual compensation managers 
receive in a particular year. 
 Comparing Tables 7.1 and 7.2, it is immediately clear that managers in this sample of for-
profit firms earn considerably more than managers in the sample of nonprofits. The average real 
(1998) salary over all years in the sample is $584,754 (median, $528,100). The average bonus is 
very similar, with a mean of $566,574 and a median of $304,769. The median is higher than the 
mean in this case, no doubt, because of the large number of managers with a zero bonus in a 
given year. The average “total compensation” for this group of CEOs is $3,189,836, with a 
median of $1,634,071. The mean is higher here since some managers have extremely large 
values of option grants in a given year, and this increases the mean substantially relative to the 
median. 
 It is also clear from Table 7.2 that while average (and even median) salaries declined 
somewhat during the 1990s, the total compensation packages for CEOs of these firms increased 
dramatically from $2.7 million in 1992 to more than $4.5 million in 1998. This is, in large part, 
due to the dramatic increase in the value of stock options granted to CEOs and other top 
managers over this period (see Hall and Liebman, 1998). 
 The bottom part of Table 7.2 presents some information on some simple financial 
characteristics of firms over the sample period. The average market value (total number of shares 
outstanding times the year-end price of a share) over the sample period is $4.64 billion. The 
median is obviously much smaller since some firms are extremely large and make the mean 
higher than the median. Assets for these firms are, on average, $8.37 billion (median, $1.28 
billion), and average annual sales are $3.78 billion (median, $1.10 billion). So these are quite 
large firms in the United States. However, given the difference between the means and the 
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medians and the size of the standard errors, there is quite a bit of variability in the size of these 
firms. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
 
Differences by Industry in the Two Sectors 
 
 There are quite substantial differences in how managers are paid and in the makeup of the 
organizations across industries in both the nonprofit sample and the for-profit sample. In fact, in 
some industries, the average compensation is more than three times that in other industries. 
 Separating organizations into “industries” is rather clear-cut and straightforward in the 
for-profit sector but is more controversial in the nonprofit sector. I will use the National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) to classify the nonprofit organizations into separate 
groups (Stevenson, Pollack, and Lampkin, 1997; Hodgkinson, 1990; Hodgkinson and Toppe, 
1991; Gronbjerg, 1994; Turner, Nygren, and Bowen, 1992). The NTEE classifies organizations 
into a variety of subgroups. For the purposes of this chapter, I have used the twenty-six “major 
NTEE groups” listed in Table 7.3. It is clear that the nonprofit organizations studied here are 
diverse. The organizations in the “medical research” group are without a doubt performing quite 
different tasks than those in the “religion-related, spiritual development” group. Although each 
organization represented in Table 7.3 is a nonprofit, there may be for-profit organizations that 
compete for employees and other staff with organizations in this group of nonprofits. Using these 
data from 1992-1998, the lowest industry median top officer compensation is $66,385, in the 
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category “housing, shelter,” and the highest is in “science and technology research institutions, 
services.” 
 Table 7.3 also lists a set of medians of other important characteristics for each industry. 
The median assets vary from $2.2 million to $46.7 million. The variation in the percentage of 
total expenses spent on program services varies, but all industries are in the range of 75-95 
percent. Obviously, some industries have a lot more organizations in them than others; the 
largest is “health—general and rehabilitative.” This may suggest that many nonprofit hospitals 
are in the sample, and the data indicate that these are highly paid managers. One potential reason 
for this could be that the nonprofit organizations in this industry are competing with (potentially 
higher-paying) for-profit hospitals. (See Bertrand, Hallock, and Arnould, 2003, and Brickley and 
Van Horn, 2002, for more details on compensation for managers in nonprofit hospitals.) 
 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
 
 Table 7.4 repeats this analysis for the set of for-profit firms by organizing the firms into 
twelve broad industry categories according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). No 
firms in the EXECUCOMP sample were assigned to the category “public administration” or 
“environmental quality and housing.” Even among the for-profit firms, there is substantial 
variation in mean compensation from one industry to another. 
 It is no particular surprise that finance, insurance, and real estate has the highest median 
total compensation ($2,277,112). Agricultural production has the lowest at $1,256,575. 
Comparing the total compensation column with the salary and bonus column, it is easy to see 
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that although salaries and bonuses don’t vary much across industries, total compensation does. 
Market value, sales, and assets all vary similarly across these industries. 
 
Relationship Between Organization Size and Managerial Pay 
 
 One of the most important predictors of managerial pay in the for-profit sector is the size 
of the organization (Rosen, 1992), and this has been documented extensively (see, for example, 
Murphy, 1985, 1999; Kostiuk, 1990). The same also holds true in nonprofit organizations. Oster 
(1998) documents a relationship between managerial pay and assets in five samples of between 
thirty-one and ninety- five observations. I also document this relationship using roughly thirty-
two thousand observations of data from 1992-1996 (Hallock, 2002b). Here I will extend this 
work and show that there is a substantial relationship between the compensation of the top 
manager of an organization and the size of the organization, using data for both the nonprofit and 
for-profit sectors between 1992 and 1998. 
 Figure 7.1 is a plot for the nonprofit data of median compensation versus median assets 
by industry (this is done by industry because if it were done by organization, there would be 
47,699 points in the figure). A strong positive correlation between the two is apparent. The 
numbers in the figure correspond to the twenty- six NTEE “industries” identified in Table 7.3. A 
similar plot for median compensation versus median assets by industries for the for-profit sample 
in presented in Figure 7.2. The numbers on this plot correspond to the SIC industry classification 
used in Table 7.4. Industries in categories 8 (finance, insurance, and real estate) and 12 
(unclassified establishments) are much larger, in terms of median assets, than any of the other 
Managerial Pay        17 
 
industries. It is clear from this figure that the strong relationship between firm size and 
managerial pay described by Rosen (1992) holds up in these data. 
 This same relationship between managerial pay and organization size can been seen in a 
simple regression framework. The virtues of using a regression framework to summarize this 
relationship are many. First, we can give a description of the idea with one simple number. 
Second, we can control for the effects of time by using time indicators. Third, we can control for 
other characteristics of the organizations, such as their “industries” or even other unmeasured 
characteristics. The most basic of these specifications is at the top of Table 7.5. In column 1, the 
ln(total compensation of the top officer) is regressed on the ln(net ending assets) of the 
organization plus yearly time indicators to control for differences over time. The coefficient 
0.229 suggests that as the assets increase by 10 percent, the average pay of the top manager 
increases by 2.29 percent. 
 
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
 Perhaps this relationship between the pay of the top manager and the size of the 
organization is due to unmeasured organization characteristics that are driving both the 
compensation and the size of the organization. One such possibility is the NTEE “industry” of 
the organization. Therefore, in column 2, the same analysis is repeated while controlling for the 
twenty-six NTEE indicator variables. The effect of ln(assets) is now smaller, 0.217, but is still 
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significantly different from zero. Therefore, even when looking within industries, the 
organization size-managerial pay relationship holds up. Finally, we may imagine that different 
firms have unmeasured characteristics that we may want to consider. Column 3 then adds in 
12,324 individual indicator variables, one for each distinct organization. The result, 0.059, 
indicates that when a firm gets larger (when its assets grow), the pay of the top manager also 
grows. However, the effect is much smaller than the cross-section estimate in column 1. Here, if 
the organization is 10 percent larger, the manager’s pay increases by only 0.59 percent. 
 
 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
 
 
 Columns 4 through 6 repeat this analysis for the highest-paid employee who is not an 
officer or a director. The results are somewhat similar in that the “return to firm size” decreases 
as we add control variables. Each coefficient is somewhat smaller than in the case where the 
dependent variable is ln(compensation of the top officer). This is consistent with my calculations 
using data from 1992-1996 (Hal- lock, 2002b). 
 The Council of Better Business Bureaus recommends that donors consider what 
percentage of resources is used directly for the purposes for which the organization was formed. 
Therefore, it is at least reasonable to think about “incentive compensation” for managers of 
nonprofits. The bottom portion of Table 7.5 evaluates whether there is a link between the 
percentage of total expenses spent on program services, conditional on the size of the 
organization (measured as a function of assets) and other organization characteristics. It appears 
that in the cross section (column 1), there is a relationship between the percentage of expenses 
spent on program services and top officer pay. This completely disappears when we consider the 
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NTEE indicators or firm indicators. However, there does seem to be some relationship between 
this expense ratio and the pay of the top nonofficer, even conditional on organizational 
characteristics (columns 4-6). 
 A similar analysis is repeated for managers of for-profit organizations in Table 7.6. It is 
clear that whether we use ln(salary plus bonus) or ln(total compensation), the results are all 
strong and positive. They are somewhat higher for the ln(total compensation) dependent variable. 
It is also the case that the strength of the relationship holds up when we control for SIC industry 
indicators and even firm indicator variables. All of the “returns to assets” in the top portion of 
Table 7.6 and the “returns to market value” (another reasonable measure of size for firms) are 
higher than the corresponding numbers reported for nonprofit organizations in Table 7.5. 
 
 
Insert Table 5 Here 
 
 
 
Why Are There Differences in Compensation? 
 
 There are many possible reasons for differences in compensation. Most are extremely 
difficult to identify, especially with the kinds of data being explored here. One possibility is the 
obvious issue of firm size. As documented in this chapter and elsewhere, there is an extremely 
strong correlation between the size of an organization and the pay of its top managers. Perhaps 
one reason that managers of for-profit firms are paid so much more than managers of nonprofit 
organizations is simply that the nonprofit organizations are so much smaller. 
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 Table 7.7 reflects one attempt to investigate this empirically. The table sorts both the 
nonprofit and for-profit organizations by their assets and breaks them into ten groups containing 
equal numbers of organizations. The smallest 10 percent of nonprofit organizations are 
summarized in the first row (“Decile 1 ”), the next 10 percent are in the second row (“Decile 2”), 
on up to the largest 10 percent of the organizations in the bottom row (“Decile 10”). Column 2 
shows that the median assets range from just under $360,000 for the smallest 10 percent of 
nonprofits all the way up to $252 million for the largest 10 percent. The median managerial total 
compensation for the bottom size group is $48,441 and for the top size group, $254,068. 
 A similar descriptive analysis is provided in columns 3-5 for for-profit firms using the 
EXECUCOMP data. It is clear from column 5 that the median assets of the for-profit firms are 
much higher than those of the nonprofits, and the median salary and bonus and total 
compensation are as well. However, it may be reasonable to compare nonprofit organizations 
with for-profit organizations of the same size. The closest comparison comes in decile 10 for the 
nonprofits, which has median assets of $252 million, and decile 2 for the for-profit organizations, 
which has median assets of $246 million. These represent a group of organizations of similar size 
in terms of assets. The median total compensation for the decile 10 nonprofits is $254,068, and 
the median salary and bonus and total compensation for the decile 2 for-profits are $270,125 and 
$514,382, respectively. So when comparing for-profits and nonprofits of similar size, the salary 
and bonus numbers are relatively similar. However, the nonsalary compensation (mostly the 
value of new stock option grants) nearly doubles the pay for the for-profit group. 
 
 
Insert Table 6 Here 
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Insert Table 7 Here 
 
 
 
Gender Differences in Managerial Pay 
 
 One other issue of note is the gender wage gap for managers in nonprofit and for- profit 
organizations. I will summarize two recent examinations of the issue. In one, my colleague 
Marianne Bertrand and I analyzed the gender pay and employment gap for managers of for-profit 
firms using data from EXECUCOMP from 1992-1997 (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001). In the 
other, I performed a similar analysis using a unique sample of nonprofit heads whose gender was 
identified (Hallock, 2002a). 
 In the latter, I studied the gender wage gap among managers of nonprofits using data 
from the Annual Chanty Index published by the Philanthropic Advisory Service (PAS) of the 
Council of Better Business Bureaus from 1993 through 1996. The data collected from PAS are 
similar to those collected from the Forms 990 re- v ported to the Internal Revenue Service, but in 
this case the gender of the top manager is identified and the number of cases is much smaller. 
But even though the PAS sample is much smaller than that of the IRS (only 606 observations), 
comparisons of means for several of the financial characteristics show that the organizations are 
quite similar in size. 
 About 19 percent of the organizations in the sample are run by women (Hallock, 2002a), 
and this ratio is fairly constant over the period of the sample. And although women are fairly 
well represented among the top managerial positions, these women earn roughly 20 percent less 
than their male counterparts who run other nonprofits. However, as we have noted with both the 
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IRS nonprofit sample and the EXECUCOMP sample, managerial pay, even in nonprofits, is 
strongly related to the size of the organizations. Furthermore, there is a generally negative 
relationship between the size of a nonprofit and the probability that a woman runs it. When even 
very simple characteristics of the organizations are controlled for (such as industry or assets), the 
gender pay gap for nonprofit managers disappears. 
 The Bertrand and Hallock (2001) study of gender pay and employment gaps for 
managers of for-profit firms used Standard & Poor’s EXECUCOMP data for the years 1992-
1997. EXECUCOMP not only carefully details financial and accounting characteristics of the 
firms and the compensation of the top manager but also examines specifics of the compensation 
plans for each of the five highest-paid employees for each year. The gender of the managers is 
also identified. Women are much more likely to lead large nonprofit organizations than they are 
to lead for-profit firms. The fraction of women leading for-profits in the EX- ECUCOMP sample 
rose from about 1.3 percent in 1992 to 3.4 percent in 1997. This is a dramatic increase, but the 
total number of women leading for-profits remains quite small. Furthermore, the women leading 
these for-profit organizations earn about 45 percent less than their male counterparts. Again, 
much of this gap can be explained by the fact that men and women are leading different kinds of 
organizations. Once firm size and the specific occupation of the manager are taken into account, 
the pay gap is reduced by about three-fourths. When firm size, occupation, age, and experience 
are all controlled for at once, the gender wage gap is only about 5 percent and is not statistically 
different from zero. 
 A great deal more attention needs to be devoted to determining why women are more 
likely than men to work for nonprofits (Odendahl and O’Neill, 1994) and to lead them (Hallock, 
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2002a). In addition, pay differences by gender within and across sectors should be further 
investigated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Surprisingly little is known about compensation in the nonprofit sector, and data are hard 
to come by. Even though some large data sources (such as the U.S. Bureau of the Census) 
identify the sector in which workers are employed, because these data are cross-sectional, only 
so much can be done with them. New panel data sources such as those from the IRS will help us 
learn more about the nonprofit sector, how it is run, and how its managers are compensated. 
Many of the areas that have been explored in the literature on managerial compensation in the 
for-profit sector (relative performance, compensation differences internationally, gender gaps) 
need to be studied in the nonprofit sector. 
 It would also be useful to have access to research on specific “industries” in the nonprofit 
world. The comparisons in this chapter have assumed that within sectors (nonprofit and for-
profit), all firms are interested in the same outcome (shareholder returns) and that all nonprofits 
are interested in some relatively common outcome. That assumption for the latter group may not 
be true. Therefore, studies of individual industries (like that of Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and 
Epifantseva, 2000, on university presidents) may be enlightening. 
  
Managerial Pay        24 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
  
Managerial Pay        25 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
  
Managerial Pay        26 
 
Table 3 
 
Managerial Pay        27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
  
Managerial Pay        28 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
 
 
  
Managerial Pay        29 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
 
  
Managerial Pay        30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
 
 
  
Managerial Pay        31 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
  
Managerial Pay        32 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
  
Managerial Pay        33 
 
References 
 
Antle, R., and Smith, A. “An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of 
Chief Executive Officers.” Journal of Accounting Research, 1986, 24, 1-39. 
Bertrand, M., and Hallock, K. F. “The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs.” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 2001, 55(1), 3-21. 
Bertrand, M., Hallock, K. E, and Arnould, R. “Does Managed Care Change the Mission of 
Nonprofit Hospitals? Evidence from the Managerial Labor Market.” Unpublished 
manuscript, University of Chicago and University of Illinois, 2003. 
Black, E, and Scholes, M. “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 1973, 81, 637-654. 
Brickley, J. A., and Van Horn, L. “Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence 
from Hospitals.” Journal of Law and Economics, 2002, XLV, 227-249. 
Burbridge, L. C. “The Occupational Structure of Nonprofit Industries: Implications for Women.” 
In T. Odendahl and M. O’Neil (eds.), Women and Power in the Nonprofit Sector. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994. 
Conyon, M., and Murphy, K. J. “The Prince and the Pauper: CEO Pay in the U.S. and U.K.” 
Economic Journal, 2000, 110, 640-671. 
Council of Better Business Bureaus. BBB Wise Giving Alliance Standards for Charitable 
Accountability. [http://www.give.org/standards/newcbbbstds.asp]. 2003. 
Ehrenberg, R. G., Cheslock, J. J., and Epifantseva, J. “Paying Our Presidents: What Do Trustees 
Value?” Working paper no. 7886. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2000. 
Managerial Pay        34 
 
Fama, E. “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 
88, 288-307. 
Gibbons, R., and Murphy, K. J. “Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1990, 43(3), 30s-51s. 
Gooddeeris, J. “Compensating Differentials and Self-Selection: An Application to Lawyers.” 
Journal of Political Economy, 1988, 96, 411-428. 
Gronbjerg, K. “Using NTEE to Classify Nonprofit Organizations: An Assessment of Human 
Service and Regional Applications.” Voluntas, 1994, 5, 301-328. 
Grossman, S., and Hart, O. “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem.” Econometrica, 1983, 
5(1), 7-45. 
Hall, B., and Liebman, J. “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1998, 113, 653-691. 
Hallock, K. F. “Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations.” In G. R. Ferris (ed.), Research in 
Personnel and Human Resources Management. Vol. 19. New York: Elsevier Science, 
2000. 
Hallock, K. F. “The Gender and Employment Gaps for Top Managers in Nonprofits.” Working 
paper, University of Illinois, 2002a. 
Hallock, K. F. “Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits.” Industrial Relations, 
2002b, 41, 377-406. 
Hallock, K. E, and Murphy, K. J. “Introduction.” In K. F. Hallock and K. J. Murphy (eds.), 
Executive Compensation. Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 1999. 
Hansmann, H. B. “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise.” Tale Law Journal, 1980, 89, 835-901. 
Hansmann, H. B. The Ownership of Enterprise. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1996. 
Managerial Pay        35 
 
Hodgkinson, V A. “Mapping the Nonprofit Sector in the United States: Implications for 
Research.” Voluntas, 1990, 7(2), 6-32. 
Hodgkinson, V A., and Toppe, C. “A New Research and Planning Tool for Managers: The 
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities.” Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 1991, 
1, 403-414. 
Holmstrom, B. “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10(1), 74—
91. 
Internal Revenue Service. Instructions to Form 990. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2002. 
James, E., and Rose-Ackerman, S. The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economies. New York: 
Harwood Academic Press, 1986. 
Jensen, M., and Meckling, W. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Capital Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3, 305-360. 
Jensen, M., and Murphy, K. J. “Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 1990, 98, 225—264. 
Kostiuk, P. F. “Firm Size and Executive Compensation.” Journal of Human Resources, 1990, 25, 
90-105. 
Lazear, E. P. Personnel Economics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995. 
Lazear E. P, and Rosen, S. “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 1981, 89, 841-864. 
Murphy, K. J. “Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis.” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1985, 7, 11-42. 
Managerial Pay        36 
 
Murphy, K. J. “Executive Compensation.” In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of 
Labor Economics. Vol. 3B. New York: Elsevier North-Holland, 1999. 
Odendahl, T, and O’Neill, M. Women and Power in the Nonprofit Sector. San Francisco: Jossey- 
Bass, 1994. 
Oster, S. “Executive Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector.” Nonprofit and Management 
Leadership, 1998, 8, 201-221. 
Preston, A. “The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World.” Journal of Labor Economics, 1989, 
7, 438—463. 
Rosen, S. “Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition.” 
Journal of Political Economy, 1974, 82, 34—55. 
Rosen, S. “The Theory of Equalizing Differences.” In O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (eds.), The 
Handbook of Labor Economics. Elsevier Science: New York, 1986. 
Rosen, S. “Contracts and the Market for Executives.” In L. Werin and H. Wijkander (eds.), Main 
Currents in Contract Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
Steinberg, R. “Labor Economics and the Nonprofit Sector: A Literature Review.” Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 1990a, 19, 151-70. 
Steinberg, R. “Profits and Incentive Compensation in Nonprofit Firms.” Nonprofit and 
Management Leadership, 1990b, 1, 137-152. 
Stevensen, D. R., Pollack, T. H, and Lampkin, L. M. The State Nonprofit Almanac, 1997: 
Profiles of Charitable Organizations. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1997. 
“Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2.” Public Law, 104-168, July 30, 1996. 
Turner, S. E., Nygren, T. I., and Bowen, W. G. “The NTEE Classification System: Tests of 
Reliability/Validity in the Field of Higher Education.” Voluntas, 1992, 4(1), 73-94. 
Managerial Pay        37 
 
Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., and Wruck, K. H. “Stock Prices and Top Management Changes.” 
Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20, 461-492. 
Weisbach, M. “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover.” Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 
20, 431—460. 
Weisbrod, B. A. “Nonprofit and Proprietary Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials Among 
Lawyers.” Journal of Labor Economics, 1983, 1, 246-263. 
Weisbrod, B. A. “Rewarding Performance That Is Hard to Measure: The Private Nonprofit 
Sector.” Science, May 5, 1989, pp. 541-546. 
Weisbrod, B. A., and Schlesinger, M. “Public, Private, Nonprofit Ownership and the Response to 
Asymmetric Information: The Case of Nursing Homes.” In S. R. Ackerman (ed.), The 
Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986. 
